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marginal to the currently fashionable micropolitical sites of critical scholarship. However, liberal, as well as
postmodern scholarship, has largely preferred to ignore the ramifications of the "new economy," which
includes a marked political shift to the right, the contraction of the public sphere, the privatization of public
goods, globalization, and a preoccupation with efficiency, economic rationalism, and profits. I argue that
technical reasoning, or "technocentrism," has enabled corporatism to evade scrutiny. I explore the meaning of
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COMMENTARY
TECHNOCENTRISM IN THE LAW
SCHOOL: WHY THE GENDER AND
COLOUR OF LAW REMAIN THE
SAME©
By MARGARET THORNTON*
Despite valiant endeavours by feminist, critical race,
and Queer scholars to transform the legal culture, the
transformative project has been limited because of the
power of corporatism, a phenomenon deemed marginal
to the currently fashionable micropolitical sites of
critical scholarship. However, liberal, as well as
postmodern scholarship, has largely preferred to ignore
the ramifications of the "new economy," which includes
a marked political shift to the right, the contraction of
the public sphere, the privatization of public goods,
globalization, and a preoccupation with efficiency,
economic rationalism, and profits. I argue that
technical reasoning, or "technocentrism," has enabled
corporatism to evade scrutiny. I explore the meaning
of "technocentrism," with particular regard to legal
education. Because corporate power does not operate
from a unitary site, but is diffused, I show how it
impacts upon legal education from multiple sites, from
outside as well as inside the legal academy in a
concerted endeavour to maintain the status quo.
En d~pit des tentatives courageuses des universitaires
fdministes, anti-racistes, et homosexuels, visant A
transformer la culture juridique, le projet de
transformation a 6t6 limits A cause du pouvoir
corporatiste. Ce ph~nom~ne est considdr6 marginal par
rapport aux domaines d'6tudes critiques
micropolitiques actuellement A la mode. Toutefois, la
doctrine lib6ral, A l'instar de la recherche post-
moderne, a largement pr6fer6 d'ignorer les
ramifications de la nouvelle 6conomie, laquelle inclut
un changement politique notable vers ]a droite, une
diminution de ]a sphere publique, la privatisation des
biens publics, la globalisation et un souci d'efficacit6, de
rationalisme 6conomique et de profits. Je soutiens que
le raisonnement technique, ou le "technocentrisme," a
permis au corporatisme d'6chapper a un examen
approfondi. J'explore la signification du terme
"technocentrisme," d'un point de vue particulier sur la
formation juridique. Puisque le pouvoir corporatif
n'op~re pas d'un lieu unique, mais est diffus, je
d6montre comment il influence la formation juridique
A partir de plusieurs sources, A I'ext6rieur comme
l'intirieur du milieu juridique acaddmique, dans une
tentative concert6ede maintenir le statu quo.
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Marcuse before Habermas, and Weber before Marcuse, identified as the most ominous
feature of a fully "disenchanted age" not an immaculate nihilism but a form of nihilism in
which "technical reason" (Marcuse), "means-end rationality" (Habermas), or
"instrumental rationality" (Weber) becomes the dominant and unchallengeable discourse
framing and ultimately suffusing all social practices.)
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TECHNOCENTRIC IMPERATIVE
I use the term "technocentrism" to capture the way in which
rules rationality exercises a centripetal pull within legality so as to
disqualify other forms of knowledge. With particular regard to legal
education, I seek to show how technical legal rules, with their
appearance of neutrality and objectivity, effectively mask the partiality
and the power of law, despite .contemporary moves to alter law's
masculinist and raced partiality. Far from being neutral, the technical is
in fact highly political, as Herbert Marcuse argued.2 Although dominant
interests are not temporally fixed, law continues to favour the interests
of "benchmark men," that is, those who are white, Anglo-Celtic,
heterosexual, able-bodied, and middle class, and who support a
mainstream religion and a right-of-centre politics. Benchmark
masculinity asserts its normativity by producing and reproducing itself
through legal and other discourses as the invariable standard against
which "otherness" is measured.
Law can be imagined as a transparency that is placed over
prevailing dominant interests so that it absorbs and reflects those
1 W. Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995) at 33.
2 See especially H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1964) at xvi, 168.
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interests. The movement at the edges of the transparency provides some
scope for change in the configuration of dominant interests, but not very
much. Michel Foucault's circulatory theory of power 3 acknowledges the
discursive effects of the challenges that occur at the edges, or in the
"capillaries." Foucault shows how the traditional notion of sovereign, or
juridical power, is supported by and interwoven with mechanisms of
disciplinary power because they are able to disguise and deflect attention
from the formal sites of authority and their exercise of power.4 I show
how dominant interests are served by sites and techniques within both
legal education and legal practice, together with the way in which they
are imbricated with each other. I also suggest that the fragmented
nature of contemporary corporatism, or the "new economy,"5 has
required recourse to more technocratic modes of control, leaving even
less space for alterity.
The changes that are occurring in the wake of the restructuring
of the global economy have included the dismantling of the Keynesian
welfare state, a phenomenon that has already occurred in Europe,
Canada and New Zealand.6 Neoconservatism, deregulation and the
privatization of public enterprises are notable facets of the restructuring
that is now being confronted by all industrial economies. Massive
restructuring has been facilitated through a proliferation of rational
mechanisms in order to satisfy the "means-end calculus." 7
The technocratic approach to law has been supported by
modernist legal theory, particularly legal positivism, which has paid scant
attention to power within the shifts and turns of national and global
socio-economic movements. While the modernist jurisprudential vision
has averredly been ruptured by dynamic new discourses, including
3 M. Foucault, PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. by C.
Gordon, trans. C. Gordon et al. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980) at 98 [hereinafter
PowerlKnowledge].
4 Ibid. at 106.
5 See H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the
New Economy" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
6 See P. Guislan, The Privatization Challenge: A Strategic, Legal and Institutional Analysis of
International Experience (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997); Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra
note 5 at 8; S. Bergeron, "The Nation as a Gendered Subject of Macroeconomics" in I. Bakker, ed.,
Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1996) 111; P. Morgan, ed., Privatization and the Welfare State: Implications for Consumers and the
Workforce (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1995); and J. Kelsey, Rolling Back the State: Privatization of
Power in AotearoalNew Zealand (Wellington: Bridget Williams, 1993).
7 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. by G. Roth & C.
Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) vol. 2 at 1002.
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feminist legal theory,8 legal positivism continues to be central to legal
education within law schools, because it is pre-eminently concerned with
law as a system of rules-a notion central to "learning the law." Legal
positivism assumes that law is a self-referential system that is capable of
producing "right" answers. While there are many shades of positivism,
its characteristics, as summarized by H.L.A. Hart, one of its most
influential exponents, include the idea that law is autonomous, that there
are discernible boundaries between law and morality, law and politics,
and law and other disciplines.9 While legal positivism legitimates
economic rationality in the interests of capitalism, it fails to capture the
pragmatic, the instrumental, the institutional, and the bureaucratic
elements that shape the law in action. Technocentrism goes further in,
first, emphasizing the way that techni-technical knowledge-is
privileged perennially over "non-legal" forms of knowledge. Second, the
word techni makes clear that law cannot lay claim to a scientific status,
but that it is a human artifact, and that legal truths are created, crafted,
and produced. Third, technd also conveys something of the legal bias
towards humanism and intellectualismiO Fourth, techni captures the
idea of the lawyer as the knower or all-knowing technocrat, who
possesses privileged knowledge and who exercises power as a result of
that knowledge. Indeed, as agents of legality, lawyers are the '!par
excellence institutional inventors"11 who spend their time devising ways
to circumvent regulation for corporate clients.12 Accordingly, lawyers
are also primary producers of legal knowledge, although jurisprudence-
feminist and postmodern, as well as traditional-pays more attention to
adjudication as the primary source of legal knowledge.13 The
adjudicative bias is grounded in the law school case method, which
privileges appellate decisions in which detailed written reasons are
8 See G. Minda, "Jurisprudence at Century's End" (1993) 43 J. Legal Educ. 27 at 30.
9 See especially The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) at 302. See also C.J.G.
Sampford, The Disorder of Law: A Critique of Legal Theory (New York: B. Blackwell, 1989) at 24ff.
10 Compare D.O. Friedrichs, "Narrative Jurisprudence and Other Heresies: Legal Education
at the Margins" (1990) 40 J. Legal Educ. 3 at 14.
11 M. Cain, "The Symbol Traders" in M. Cain & C.B. Harrington, eds., Lawyers in a
Postmodem World. Translation and Transgression (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 15
at 31.
12 See D. McBarnet, "Legal Creativity: Law, Capital and Legal Avoidance" in Cain &
Harrington, eds., supra note 11, 73.
13 Compare R.W. Gordon & W.S. Simon "The Redemption of Professionalism?" in R.L.
Nelson, D.M. Trubek & R.L. Solomon, eds., Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in
the American Legal Profession (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992) 230 at 238.
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produced. The high level of abstraction associated with superior
appellate courts facilitates a propositional approach, relegating the
merits and particularity of cases to the background. The pedagogical
practice, which focuses primarily on formal rules, creates a law school
environment in which the technocratic is normalized, thereby facilitating
the connection between the means and the end.
The specification of particular subjects and areas of law by
admitting authorities encourages the teaching of law as unproblematic
categories of finite technical knowledge. The reduction of social
problems to predetermined legal formulae permits what then passes for
bona fide legal knowledge to be cordoned off from the affective, the
corporeal, and the intuitive. The substance of the "core" legal
curriculum is remarkably similar within Western liberal democratic
countries, not only within common law jurisdictions,14 but also within
civil law jurisdictions.15 Indeed, the "core" curriculum has witnessed
comparatively few major changes of substance over the past half century,
apart from the tendency to make more similarly oriented subjects
compulsory. This is the phenomenon of the "creeping core" to which
William Twining refers in the English context.16 Even within new law
schools, curricular consistency is a notable characteristic. The subjects
that are specified as essential prerequisites for admission to legal
practice pertain to private property, individual rights and profits, 17
thereby reflecting the dominant capitalist imperatives, even though
modes of capital accumulation may have altered. Accordingly, it is no
surprise to find that the foundational subjects include contract, property,
torts and company law-subjects that tend to be preoccupied with
technical rules, and are known as "hard" law, thereby also signifying
their phallocentric orientation. Such subjects facilitate the free market,
corporatism, and private property ownership, and are invariably treated
as compulsory within the law curriculum-either as prerequisites for the
award of a law degree and/or for admission to the practice of law.
14 See: R.L. Abel & P.S.C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World, vol. 1
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); T.C. Fischer, Legal Education, Law Practice, and
the Economy: A New England Study (Littleton, Colo.: F.B. Rothman, 1990); and S. Garkawe, "The
Proliferation of Law Schools in Australia-Should Australia Adopt the American Bar Exam
Model?" (1995) 13 J. Prof. Legal Educ. 23.
15 See R.L. Abel & P.S.C. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: The Civil Law World, vol. 2
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
16 W.L. Twining, Blackstone's Tower. The English Law School (London: Stevens & Sons/Sweet
& Maxwell, 1994) at 163.
17 Compare ibid. at 165; and H.J. Glasbeek & R.A. Hasson, "Some Reflections on Canadian
Legal Education" (1987) 50 Mod. L. Rev. 777 at 795.
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Commercially oriented subjects may be contrasted with subjects
that involve the intimate aspects of people's lives, which are not easily
commodified This cluster of subjects includes family law, human rights
and discrimination law-the averredly "soft" or feminized subjects that
are primarily concerned with women and children, as well as raced,
ethnicized, and sexualized "others," rather than the benchmark Anglo,
heterosexual, middle-class man of law. Because of the unruliness of the
social and its resistance to being compressed within legal form, it may be
suggested that subjects involving the affective and the conventionally
private are not "real" law, so that teachers of "soft" subjects sometimes
set out to harden them by teaching them primarily as propositional and
rules-based. In such a case, the centripetal pull of rules rationality may
be compared to the way in which some women and "others" are
attracted to masculinized subject positions in employment in order to
secure approval and legitimacy.
In an endeavour to discourage reflexivity, technocentrism
purports to slough off the theoretical, the critical and the contextual but,
as Ian Duncanson reminds us, law always does have a context.18 The
1970s imperative that law be taught "in context" instantiates the myth
that technocratic law is taught as though it were neutral and acontextual
-as though it were engaged in the pursuit of objective justice, rather
than primarily facilitating the interests of wealthy corporations and
benchmark men. Perhaps unsurprisingly, liberal legalism prefers any
conscious advertence to context to be anodyne. Critical perspectives,
with their subversive potential, and "soft" subjects, with their partial and
humanistic orientation, are likely to be treated as optional or peripheral
to the project of creating the "compleat lawyer."
The seeming neutrality and objectivity of legal doctrinalism
effectively legitimates curricular cleavages between the compulsory
contract-tort-crime-commercial clustering and the optional family-
human-rights-theoretical clustering so that such cleavages are assumed
to be rational. The divisions mirror the separation between public and
private spheres of life, which are also assumed to be rational and
"natural" and are legitimated by law.1 9 In fact, the public/private
dichotomy is a convenient and malleable mechanism that has been
constituted so that it shifts according to the political demands of the
18 See I. Duncanson, "The Ends of Legal Studies" (1997) 3 Web J. Curr. Legal Issues 1
[hereinafter "The Ends of Legal Studies"], available on the Internet at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk.
19 See M. Thornton, ed., Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne: Oxford
University Press, 1995); and K O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1985).
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moment. Nevertheless, this separation operates to maintain very
effectively particular iterations of masculinity and femininity, and of
heterosexuality and homosexuality. If law wishes to avert its eyes from
nuptial and pre-nuptial contracts, for example, it will characterize them,
as private-because they lack the technical requirements of intent and
consideration.2 0 In contrast, a court will have no problem with a
contract between strangers engaging in a profitmaking transaction; it is
unlikely even to expend time on the threshold question of whether there
was a contract or not. Separate spheres are thereby constructed through
law, and the activities of the market are legitimized and privileged over
those characterized as private qua domestic, such as housework and
child care-activities performed for love, not money. However, a
feminist preoccupation with the gendered symbiosis between private and
public life worlds can deflect attention from the dramatic changes being
effected within the public sphere qua government with regard to the
deregulation and privatization of education and welfare, and other
heretofore "public" services.
For all intents and purposes, a merger has been effected between
so-called "private" enterprise and the public sphere of government.21
This is the "new corporatism." 22 Deregulation and privatization,
together with the declining role of unions, have significantly altered the
corporatist character of the state. Nevertheless, the idea that there is a
clear boundary between public and private life continues to be pervasive.
Through the play on difference, or what Jacques Derrida refers to as
diffdrance,23 between public and private, law is able to "oil the wheels of
capitalism" in a way that appears unproblematic and even natural. 24
Furthermore, the consistent devaluation of the private qua domestic
and/or sexual aspects of life continues to have significant ramifications
20 See Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (C.A.), which continues to be good law in both
England and Australia. For a critique, see M. Freeman, "Contracting in the Haven: Balfour v.
Balfour Revisited" in R. Halson, ed., Exploring the Boundaries of Contract (Aldershot, U.K.:
Dartmouth, 1996).
21 See C.A. Reich, Opposing the System (New York: Crown, 1995) at 169.
22 The concept of corporatism emerged in political theory in the 1970s to describe the
distinctive organization of economic and political interests within the capitalist state in a centralized
and harmonious manner: see P.J. Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective: An Introductory Guide to
Corporatist Theory (London: Sage, 1989); and A. Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1986).
23 See P. Kamuf, ed.,A Derrida Reader Between the Blinds (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991) at 63.
24 See J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1975), for a
thoroughgoing critique of the way capitalist economic society is presented as "natural."
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
for the construction of masculinity and femininity, and of heterosexuality
and homosexuality, despite the ongoing efforts of feminist and Queer
legal scholars to remove the cloak enshrouding the private. Indeed,
corporatism is predicated upon and sustained by law's constitution and
retention of separate spheres, cleverly concealed beneath a technocratic
carapace. The accord between the public sphere qua government, civil
society, and the economy is possible only with the unacknowledged
contributions of women in the private qua domestic sphere. The
lopsided efforts of legislation to effect equal opportunity in the public
sphere perpetuate this inequity no less than other, ostensibly neutral,
regimes.
II. TECHNE IN THE LAW SCHOOL
In order to ensure retention of the privileged status of technd,
there is an expectation of docility from law students in order that they
might be transformed through the experience of legal education. The
docile student is one who is teachable (from the Latin docere: to teach).
Foucault defines the docile body as one that may be "subjected, used,
transformed and improved."25 In the context of legal education, the
process of transformation is likely to be facilitated with the law student's
consent; students cannot be said to be oppressed in the sense that Paulo
Freire speaks of pedagogical oppression. 26 Indeed, so great is their
anxiety to conform that within a few weeks of commencing law school,
law students sound like fully fledged lawyers with a proficient command
of the grammar of law. The lure of professionalism is a powerful factor
in effecting the transformative project. Furthermore, the majority of law
students in traditional law schools are generally not social outsiders.
Private school background and family connections mean that there is
already an acceptance of the correlation between white ruling class,
masculinity, and legality,27 an homology that facilitates acceptance of
corporatism.
While the image of "the lawyer" has been constructed in terms of
benchmark man, the desire on the part of some women and law students
25 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punisk The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York:
Vintage, 1995) at 136 [hereinafter Discipline and Punish].
2 6 See P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans., M.B. Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1996)
at 33.
27 See A. Ziegert, "Social Structure, Educational Attainment and Admission to Law School"
(1992) 3 Legal Educ. Rev. 155.
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from diverse class and cultural backgrounds to be quiescent, anonymous,
and assimilable cannot be discounted. To some extent, they act as the
agents of their own transformation. They go to law school because they
wish to make a successful career in law and to erase any memory of
perceived disadvantage as quickly as possible. They evince an ever-
present desire to move close to the norm, that is, the privileged position
occupied by benchmark man, to merge with him and to become
indistinguishable from him. Some students are aided and abetted in the
normalizing project by upwardly mobile parents who may have
experienced disadvantage and lack of opportunity themselves. The
public ranking of law schools by the media28 can induce anxiety in
students in lesser ranked schools, which they seek to overcome by
establishing their command of techni as early as possible. The
centripetal pull of techni thereby operates to slough off diversity and
radicalism in legal education.
Not all students accept the docile subject position expected of
them and they may find themselves responding with anger, anxiety, or
dismay at what they perceive to be the intellectually stultifying and
personally transformative experience of legal education.2 9  Chris
Goodrich has written insightfully about his year as a student at Yale Law
School, undertaking a special Master's degree for journalists. He
enrolled for a collection of subjects typical of first-year law students,
including constititutional law, torts, contract, and civil procedure.
Goodrich describes his fear of being seduced by legal training "which
doesn't create selfish, aggressive people-but it does provide the
intellectual equipment with which recipients can justify and give force to
beliefs and actions most people would wholeheartedly condemn."3 0 He
proceeds to describe the subtle process that the law school engaged in to
"steal his soul." Being taught to "think like a lawyer" involved inducing
a massive sense of insecurity in the first instance: "it seemed impossible
for anyone to go through a single day of law school without sensing that
he or she didn't measure up-that the ability to think like a lawyer was
demonstrably different, and better, than the ability to think as one once
did, like an ordinary person."3 1 This sense of insecurity may be
28 See, for example, "Maclean's Law School Survey" Maclean's (6 October 1997) 13.
29 Compare R. Abel, American Lawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 213.
3 0 C. Goodrich, Anarchy and Elegance: Confessions of a Journalist at Yale Law School (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1991) at 4.
31 Ibid at 4.
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magnified on the part of those women and racialized "others" who
endeavour to resist the mesmerizing effects of the norm.32
What does it mean to "think like a lawyer?" Is it qualitatively
different from thinking like any intelligent human being? The answer is
probably not. The law student learns the principles of legal reasoning
and legal method: how to identify material facts, how to characterize the
issues for resolution, how to select an authoritative precedent to be
applied to the instant case, how to determine the ratio decidendi of a
case, and how to interpret a statute,33 as well as deference to hierarchy.3 4
The successful acculturation of the law student into accepting
automatically legal form facilitates the process of rendering substantive
justice incidental. The outcome of a dispute is then treated as analogous
to the outcome of a sporting context; it does not matter who wins,
provided that the rules are fair. Technocratic law cloaks the partiality of
justice so as to disguise its masculinist, class, race, heterosexual, and
corporatist predilections. As Goodrich observes, the legal system's rules
about justice may ensure that justice is not done.35 There is, therefore, a
political dimension to learning to think like a lawyer; the process is
directed not only to improving the quality, precision, and clarity of
thinking,36 but to the rationalization of particular outcomes. It is this
unstated political dimension that constitutes the distinctive element to
"thinking like a lawyer."
The political underpinnings of law are further occluded by a
"submersion or denial of self' within legal discourse.3 7 The distance
between the legal knower-the creator of knowledge-and the
knowledge itself is collapsed, so that the knowledge appears to be
objective. A familiar technique in legal writing, and one that students
are encouraged to emulate, is the use of the third person. The norm of
depersonalization is breaking down in law review articles, where the
subjective voice has acquired a semblance of legitimacy as a result of the
32 See M. Thornton, Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1996) at 73-105 [hereinafter Dissonance and Distrust]; and C. Weiss & L.
Melling, "The Legal Education of Twenty Women" (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 at 1314.
33 See M.J. Mossman, "Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes" (1986) 3 Aust.
J.L. & Soc'y. 30.
34 See D. Kennedy, "Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy" in D. Kairys, ed., The Politics
of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon, 1982) 40.
35 Supra note 30 at 260.
36 See J.O. Mudd, "Thinking Critically About 'Thinking Like a Lawyer"' (1983) 33 J. Legal
Educ. 704.
3 7 Friedrichs, supra note 10 at 12.
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impact of feminism and postmodernism, and the correlative
denunciation of essentialism. Depersonalization, however, remains the
norm in judicial discourse. The technique operates to deny the "leeways
of choice" encountered at every step of the adjudicative process. 38 The
positivist myth that the judge lacks agency and is no more than a conduit
through which objective knowledge is received has contributed to the
erasure of the subject and the dehumanization of law.
The form of law is a key technocratic device for delimiting the
ambit of law that quickly takes on an appearance of normalcy and
naturalness to the neophyte law student. I have noted the limits of law
as a remedial tool in addressing systemic complaints of discrimination39
The sexism, racism, and homophobia giving rise to discriminatory acts
are buried deep within the social fabric, but a formal complaint requires
a complainant to identify a particular wrongdoer and to prove a
causative nexus between the wrongdoer and the impugned conduct. The
social harms of sexism, racism, and homophobia are not legal harms
unless they can be made to conform with the procedural requirements of
a formal complaint. The probative burden that the individual
complainant has to bear is onerous, particularly in the case of
employment complaints where the employer invariably adduces a
rational explanation for the impugned conduct. The disparity in power
and resources between an individual complainant and a respondent
make it almost impossible for, say, an Aboriginal woman to succeed in
proving employment discrimination according to the requisite standard
against, say, a mining corporation. To endure a hearing and then fail to
satisfy the burden according to legal form may actually legitimize racism
and sexism because the discriminator has been exonerated by a
seemingly fair and neutral process in which it is assumed that
complainant and respondent are engaged in a contest on a "level playing
field" because both "sides" have legal representation. This is the myth
of equality before the law. The form of law privileges corporatism, as
well as masculinism and racism, for respondents in sex and race
discrimination suits are invariably powerful institutional players with
significant resources. Harry Arthurs and Robert Kreklewich suggest
that the privileging of corporatism in legal disputes is likely to become
more overt with the propulsion towards deregulation and privatization. 40
38 j. Stone, Legal Systems and Lawyers' Reasonings (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press,
1964).
39 See M. Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990) [hereinafter The Liberal Promise].
40 See supra note 5 at 27.
1998]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
When we focus a little more closely on approaches to teaching in
a professional program, it can be seen that technocentrism permits the
development of what Charles Derber calls "ideological
desensitization."41  The focus on technical knowledge enables
professional workers to deny the real significance of the work in which
they are engaged. This concept is particularly pertinent to law as it
facilitates an understanding of the way in which legal practititioners are
able to absolve themselves from ethical responsibility when serving
dubious interests, such as defending the racist and sexist behaviour of a
mining company against a complaint of discrimination by an Aboriginal
woman. The predominant ethical interest is loyalty to one's client, a
principle upheld by the adversarialism of the common law and the "cab
rank" rule of the legal culture. Broader issues of ethical practice and
justice are likely to be given short shrift and treated as subordinate to the
mastery of rules. The technocentric imperative is underpinned by the
fact that professional ethics rarely are accorded even the status of an
optional subject within the law curriculum, although admitting
authorities may require a few hours of lectures pertaining to the rules of
professional conduct in terms of "unreflective conformity." 4 2 The
"good" lawyer is one who sets out to win the case for the client,
regardless of the social ramifications.
The ethical dilemmas are complicated by the fickleness of
corporate clients in the postmodern world, for they no longer feel
obliged to remain loyal to a particular legal firm, but are likely to shop
around for one prepared to do their bidding at the best price.43 Hence,
the corporate client can exert pressure on maverick law firms to
refashion professional ethics, always located in a shadowy terrain behind
techni. Law and the facilitation of corporatism thereby become
imbricated with each other so that what might elsewhere pass for
unethical behaviour becomes normalized. Students are quickly
acculturated into accepting this mode of thought. Derber reports that
studies involving first-year students in a wide range of professions,
including law, reveal a rapid shift from a predominantly moral
41 C. Derber, "Managing Professionals: Ideological Proletarianization and Mental Labour" in
C. Derber, ed., Professionals as Workers: Mental Labour in Advanced Capitalism (Boston: G.K. Hall,
1982) 167 at 180.
42 Gordon & Simon, supra note 13 at 236.
43 See E. Nosworthy, "Ethics and Large Law Firms" in S. Parker & C. Sampford, eds., Legal
Ethics and Legal Practice: Contemporary Issues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) at 57. See also Gordon &
Simon, supra note 13 at 257.
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orientation to a technocratic one.44 The phenomenon of law students
demanding to know "the law" and resisting theoretical and critical
material is a familiar one to teachers of first-year law students,
particularly those teaching non-technocratic courses, such as history and
philosophy of law, and introductory jurisprudence. The metamorphosis
of the neophyte law student concerned with social justice into graduate
obsessed with status and money has joined the stock figures that
populate anti-lawyer jokes.45
The pedagogical methods of law school assist in embedding the
technocratic approach and the moral neutering of the law student.46
The so-called Socratic method, widely attacked because of the scarifying
experiences to which students have been subjected,4 7 has had a
narrowing effect because law teachers-unlike Socrates himself-all too
often assume that there is a right answer. Even more constraining is the
lecture method. Current financial pressure on public universities is
causing a reversion to large lectures, where the interchange between
lecturer and student is minimal, and the student passively imbibes
predigested knowledge. The pressure to teach more students means that
research essays, which provide at least a modicum of scope for
imagination and critique, are likely to be discouraged-because they
take longer to assess than examination scripts. Economic rationality aids
in reining in knowledge boundaries so that students understand that they
are expected to regurgitate aspects of the doctrinal exegesis that
comprised the substance of lectures-in a limited time frame, and
according to a predetermined formula. Freire's metaphor of banking
aptly describes this pedagogy-in which students are treated as passive
receptacles who receive knowledge from a "knower"-because they
44 Supra note 41 at 182.
45 See, for example, The Rodent, Explaining the Inexplicable: The Rodent's Guide to Lawyers
(New York: Pocket Books, 1995). The publicity surrounding cases involving excessive legal fees has
done little to enhance the public image of lawyers. For example, US$49 million was paid in fees and
costs to the lawyers who acted for the plaintiff flight attendants in a class action suit against four
tobacco companies. The plaintiffs received no money themselves, although an award was made for
medical research. Experts were quoted as saying that the lawyers probably received (on a
contingency fee basis) many times what their legal work was worth: see N.A. Lewis, "First Thing We
Do, Let's Pay All the Lawyers" New York Tunes (11 October 1997) A8.
46 See W. Bachman, Law v. Life: What Lawyers are Afraid to Say About the Legal Profession
(Rhinebeck, N.Y.: Four Directions, 1995) at 57.
47 See, for example, ibid. at 55; J. Morgan "The Socratic Method: Silencing Cooperation"
(1989) 1 Legal Educ. Rev. 151; and J. Jaff "Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for
Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning" (1986) 36 J. Legal Educ. 249.
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know nothing.48 The banking notion of legal consciousness is one in
which the lecturer regulates the way in which the legal world "enters
into" law students.4 9 The process contributes to the dehumanization and
objectification of legal knowledge, neutralizes the agency of students and
ensures reproduction of that which is "knowable":
The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop
the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as
transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on
them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view
of reality deposited in them.5 0
Technocentric legal knowledge disqualifies the lifeworld
knowledge students bring with them to law school, as well as the non-
legal knowledge they acquire elsewhere within the academy. Attempts
to alter the gender and colour of law from within the law school are
limited, other than in a simplistic additive sense. The micropolitical sites
of power that operate within the substance and pedagogy of legal
education are underpinned by the multi-faceted character of
corporatism.
.III. THE POWER OF CORPORATE LAW
Corporate law firms, where practice is likely to take the most
technocratic and specialized form in the interests of corporate clients,
exert a disproportionate impact on the legal culture.51 As corporate law
firms are a primary destination of law school graduates, particularly for
those from the older, 61ite, establishment institutions, and corporate
lawyers are an important source of alumni donations, 52 their "needs"
cannot be ignored in designing the curriculum. Law schools are also
anxious that corporate firms employ their graduates, and sponsor
48 Supra note 26 at 53.
49 Compare ibid. at 57.
50 Ibid. at 54.
51 See A.T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap, 1993) at 273; and A. Freeman, "A Critical Look at Corporate Practice" (1987) 37 J.
Legal Educ. 315 [hereinafter "A Critical Look"].
52 See R.L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) at 288.
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recruiting visits by them. By not promoting alternate forms of legal
practice, such as public-interest law, law schools subtly discourage it.53
Law graduates themselves find it difficult to resist the lure of the
big firms. The first-year salaries offered to associates in these firms are
often staggering, compared with typical starting salaries. Columbia
University Law School in New York City noted that the median private
sector starting salary for its graduates in 1997 was US$87,000.54 The
myth that the conjunction of money and power means corporate legal
work is the most intellectually challenging also encourages many bright
students to gravitate to the big firms with their narrow specializations.
In addition, the contraction of the public sector, and the move to abolish
or privatize public instrumentalities and utilities, has meant that there
are fewer public sector jobs for altruistically minded graduates.
Significant debts accumulated in the process of higher education also
make the financial offers of the big firms harder to resist. Once
ensnared, associates are kept captive by the firm and its large corporate
clients during a lengthy and insecure period of apprenticeship as they
work feverishly for the great rewards flowing from elevation to
partnership, including a salary as much as ten times their present salary:
"Thus, the long and painful postgraduate apprenticeship in the law firm
teaches the associate that extraordinary rewards will be granted by those
in absolute power to some of those who display total obedience and
work compulsively." 55 The intense competition stifles creativity, other
than how best to serve the interests of the firm and its corporate clients.
The increase in the time it takes to become a partner, and the
lowering of partnership rates,56 are also important technologies of power
through which knowledge boundaries are contracted. Furthermore,
partners in corporate law firms do not have the same degree of security
as in the past: today, a lacklustre performance can result in a partner
53 A survey of 168 American law schools in 1997 revealed that 66 per cent did little to promote
public interest law, in contrast to the support afforded corporate law: see B.S. Martin, "Why Most
Law Schools are Failing at Public Interest Law" NationalJurist (October 1997) 16. For an insightful
analysis of the waning student commitment to public interest law, see A. Stone, "Women, Law
School and Student Commitment to the Public Interest" in J. Cooper & L.G. Trubek, eds.,
Educating for Justice" Social Values and Legal Education (Aldershot, U.K: Ashgate, 1997) 56.
54 See "Employment at 98% for Class of 1997: Placement for the Class of '97 by Graduation
(May '97)" TheAdviser (25 August 1997) 1. The American National Association for Law Placement
noted that in 1996, the overall median salary for graduates entering private practice was US$50,000,
and US$30,000 for those entering public interest employment: see Martin, supra note 53 at 20.
55 American Lawyers, supra note 29 at 222.
56 See M. Galanter & T. Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Firm
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 63.
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being dismissed.S 7 In addition, economies of scale dictate
depersonalization and a high level of generality. National and
international law firms are stratified, bureaucratized, top-down
organizations, which bear little relationship to the typical law firm of the
past.S8 The direct ad hoc control of day-to-day operations by a small
group of partners has been replaced by a specialized division of powers
between professional administrators, long-range planners, and
department heads.59 The term "the law factory" first appeared in the
1930s to capture the growth in scale that had already occurred in
American law firms.60 Arthurs and Kreklewich refer to the "Fordist law
firm," to continue the industrial analogy into today's world, and to argue
that lawyers' lives are being altered by the new economy in ways that
parallel the working lives of blue-collar workers.61
Within the new milieu, the legal associate is transformed and
rendered docile by bureaucratization and the desire to win approval in a
way that is similar to the subjection of the law student. Employed
lawyers in the contemporary mega-firm are subject to surveillance
through a plethora of bureaucratic devices, including the phenomenon
of billable hours. Foucault draws attention to the regulation of the day
as a key disciplinary technology of power.62 If the day of the lawyer is
divided into six-minute slots, for which she is accountable, there is no
time for feminist reflexivity or critique. She must focus on being a
skilled technocrat, whether she is advising wealthy corporate clients or
"bread and butter" family law clients. The corporatization of
contemporary legal practice is therefore able to accommodate increased
numbers of women and diverse others, provided that they are docile and
accept legal orthodoxy. The universalizing tendencies of technocentrism
effectively erase advertence to the sexed, raced, and sexualized identities
of agents of legality.
The absorption of increased numbers of women, Aboriginal
people, and differentiated "others" into law has coincided with the
period of economic growth in common law countries since the 1960s and
1970s. The global economy "needed" more skilled personnel to
571bid- at 61.
58 For the classical study of status and institutional rigidity that accompanies bureaucratic
ordering, see Weber, supra note 7.
59 See Nelson, supra note 52 at 2.
60 Galanter & Palay, supra note 56 at 16-17.
6 1 Supra note 5 at 44.
6 2 Discipline and Punish, supra note 25 at 149.
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accommodate changes in the delivery of legal services. The expansion
led to the rise of "mega-firms" in Europe, North America, and Oceania,
with highly centralized and bureaucratized administrative structures
designed to adapt quickly to rapidly changing market conditions.
Reflecting the character of legal technocentrism in the way that it deals
with personnel within an abstract, rule-bound system, bureaucratization
sheds the social, the subjective, and the affective. Thus, corporate
workplaces may be prepared to adopt procedures for "dealing with"
what are largely gender-specific problems, such as sexual harassment,
because of the fear of adverse publicity. However, bureaucratization
and formalism do not necessarily mean that such workplaces are any
more sympathetic towards an embodied notion of femininity than small
workplaces that lack procedures, as is apparent in the continued
resistance towards reasonable accommodation of parenting (read
mothering), particularly for those (women) in senior positions. The
extensive feminist and legal feminist scholarship addressing these issues
seems to have had remarkably little impact upon the practice of
corporate law.
Indeed, the corporatization of law firms has resulted in a
mirroring of the gendered configurations that typify bureaucracies.
Hierarchical ordering within bureaucracies results in superordinate
positions becoming masculinized, while subordinate positions remain
feminized, racialized, and ethnicized. The characteristics of control
create the conditions of feminization that cause male flight. Thus, the
lower echelons of the legal profession, including contract, untenured,
and poorly-paid positions, are carried out by proportionally more
women than men, as is already the case in academia. "Feminization"
therefore does not mean that the increased numbers of women are
evenly distributed across the profession or within hierarchies, but that
women preponderate within the pyramidal base of professional legal
hierarchies. 6 3 Although gender, racial, and social exclusiveness may
have been reduced or even swept away at the recruitment level,64 it
remains significant within the inner sanctums of 6lite firms.65 It is
preferred that women and "others" who threaten the calculus of the
63 See Dissonance and Distrust, supra note 32.
64 Galanter & Palay, supra note 56 at 53.
65 See Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra note 5 at 47. See also C.F. Epstein et aL, "Glass Ceilings
and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession" (1995) 64 Fordham L. Rev. 291;
and J. Hagan & F. Kay, Gender in Practice: A Study of Lawyers' Lives (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
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technical should occupy subordinate positions where they will be subject
to surveillance so that any possibility of disorder can be kept at bay.
The nexus between the practice of law and corporate capital is
facilitated by the depersonalized focus on procedural rules. As Alan
Freeman points out, it is not that corporate legal practice in itself
oppresses poor people, but that it has the potential to commit ever-
increasing legal resources to corporate struggles.66 The "winner" in such
a case emerges after a paper war that may go on for months, with
lawyers working insane hours. Despite the myth that corporate practice
represents the apex of lawyerly ability, it is ultimately resources, not
expertise, that secures the victory.6 7 Hence, the system of corporate
lawyering renders it virtually impossible to effect substantive change in
the lives of those deemed peripheral to corporate interests, such as
Aboriginal people. In focusing on the technocratic rules of procedure,
the merits, or justice, of the case are soon sloughed off. In the case of
inter-corporate contests, extensive public resources-in the form of
judicial and court infrastructures-are expended in the pursuit of victory
designed to privilege particular corporate interests above others.
Camouflaged by technocentrism, these contests reify the conjunction of
status, power, money, and benchmark masculinity in obeisance to the
corporate imperative. When it is understood that the overwhelming
preponderance of litigation within courts of general jurisdiction is
dominated by corporate litigants whose lawyers are inventive
technocrats, it can be appreciated that the scope for altering the gender
and colour of either substantive or procedural law through litigation is
limited.
IV. PEDAGOGICAL POLITICS
By reference to La Trobe University as a case study, I show, first,
how the practices and politics of legal professionalism constrain the
teaching of law as an autonomous discipline; secondly, I show how
economic rationality, effected through government and university
funding practices and policies, contributes to the shaping of legal
education so as to favour corporate interests. It may be seen how
economic rationality effectively diffuses power so that the end result-
the quelling of intellectual diversity-appears reasonable.
66 See "A Critical Look," supra note 51 at 319.
6 7 See The Liberal Promise, supra note 39; and "A Critical Look," supra note 51 at 320.
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In Australia, there has been a dramatic expansion in legal
education in recent years, with the number of law schools increasing
from eleven to twenty-eight within a decade but, contrary to what the
casual observer might have expected, the evidence of curricular diversity
is limited. This increase occurred as a result of a government decision to
devolve programming responsibility to universities. The offering of law
programs was a popular choice among vice-chancellors because of the
high demand, the calibre of law students, the prestige of a professional
degree, and what was considered to be the comparatively low cost of
teaching (based on the large-lecture method). However, the expansion
in legal education coincided with the introduction of Uniform Admission
Rules (UAR) for legal practitioners in Australian states and territories in
1994. Thus, at the crucial moment of realizing the possibility of
diversification in law schools, the impetus was nipped in the bud by the
rationality of uniform rules in a federal system. The UAR specifies eleven
areas of knowledge that need to be studied for admission.68 As already
pointed out, the "core" subjects and their technical orientation exercise
immense influence on the law curriculum in the common law world,
despite ongoing attempts to diversify the "legal canon" by including
feminist, critical race, postmodern, and post-structural perspectives.
However, some of the new law schools have themselves favoured an
approach that is even more conservative than that of the established
schools in the belief that traditionally educated graduates would be able
to compete more effectively for positions in prestigious corporate law
firms. Technocentric orthodoxy is thereby clinched via the legal labour
market.69
In the current conservative and economically rationalist
environment in Australia, the intellectual parameters of the law
discipline are contracting even further. Some law schools are in the
process of sloughing off, or at least containing, their earlier commitment
to diversity in the form of socio-legal scholarship. In accordance with
the imperatives of the "new economy," higher education is in the process
of becoming another commodity within the conservative agenda. The
implication that the role of law schools is to serve dominant political and
68 Rule 3(b) specifies Criminal Law and Procedure, Torts, Contracts, Property (Real and
Personal), Equity (including Trusts), Federal and State Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure,
Evidence, Company Law and Professional Conduct.
69 Compare J. Lancaster, The Modernisation of Legal Education: A Critique of the Martin,
Bowen and Pearce Reports (Sydney: Centre for Legal Education, 1993), who attributes the lack of
vitality and substantive diversity in Australian legal education to the bureaucratic mode of
decisionmaking developed by the state in its attempts to modernize the discipline.
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commercial interests has become more overt, thereby heightening a
paradox, in that while legal education is expected to sustain corporatism,
corporatism drains the lifeblood from legal education.
The case of La Trobe University is salutary. For twenty years
legal studies programs had been taught within a school of social sciences
that did not qualify graduates for admission to legal practice. The school
was therefore not theoretically constrained in directing its critical and
scholarly gaze towards any facet, perspective, or meaning of law.
Indeed, it had been one of only a handful of institutions in the English-
speaking, common law world to focus exclusively on this project. I took
up a Chair in Legal Studies at La Trobe in 1990 when the question of
offering an LL.B., in addition to the existing programs, was being
mooted. I was excited at the prospect of being involved in an innovative
law and legal studies programs within a school of social sciences. While
the social sciences do not necessarily eschew positivism, they can provide
a critical standpoint, the possibility of which may be denied by an overly
close relationship with legal professionalism, which can occur in the case
of the more conventional law schools. In my inaugural lecture,7 0 I
considered past endeavours to integrate law with the social sciences,
such as the attempts by the American Legal Realists at Columbia Law
School in the 1920s71 and at Yale Law School in the 1930s,72 all of which
had been unsuccessful. Indeed, both Columbia and Yale Universities
instituted inquiries as to why their law schools were not teaching "law."
I hoped that by developing a transdisciplinary approach, comparable to
that adopted by Women's Studies, there would be at least a possibility of
experimenting with the integration of law and the social sciences at La
Trobe. The rigidity of disciplinary borders would then be collapsed,
allowing space for a reflexive socio-legal approach. 73
The possibility of an overwhelming legocentric bias was lessened
by the diverse disciplinary orientation of members of the school: of the
forty full-time academic staff, twenty were legally qualified, while twenty
70 See M. Thornton, Portia Lost in the Groves ofAcademe Wondering What to Do About Legal
Education (Inaugural Lecture, 1991) (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 1991).
71 See R. Stevens, "Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School" in D. Fleming & 13.
Bailyn, eds., Perspectives in American History: Law in American History, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Charles
Warren Centre for Studies in American History, 1971).
72 See L. Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1986).
73 See "The Ends of Legal Studies," supra note 18; and P. Goodrich, "Sleeping With the
Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies in America" in J.D. Leonard, ed., Legal
Studies as Cultural Studies: A Reader in (Post)modern Critical Theory (Albany: State University of
New York, 1995) 299 [hereinafter "Sleeping With the Enemy"].
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were more closely identified with history, economics, politics,
philosophy, or sociology/criminology. In a further attempt to discourage
legal professionalism from disqualifying alternate sources of knowledge,
applicants for the LL.B. programme were required to have completed at
least two years of a university degree other than law. Generally in
Australia, students undertake an LL.B. concurrently with another
undergraduate program, but the experience of combined programs has
been that law has tended to disqualify non-legal knowledge. In the La
Trobe case, it was hoped that the students, most of whom were mature
graduates, would be equipped with the necessary arsenal to resist legal
technocentrism. But, as is the case in North America, this was not to be.
The erosion of the socio-legal orientation of the law degree
began to occur even before the first students had enrolled. A list of the
"law" subjects to be offered was circulated, all of which sounded very
traditional and very familiar (albeit that the UAR had not then been
devised): contracts, torts, property, criminal law, constititutional law, and
so on. While these subjects do not have to be taught conventionally,
there was pressure to hire doctrinally oriented legal academics, rather
than socio-legal scholars, to teach what were perceived to be "black
letter" or "hard" law subjects, which immediately disturbed the
disciplinary balance among the staff. It was assumed that "to be
authentic, an understanding of law must be from a lawyer's point of
view." 74 There was concern in some quarters that the critical and
theoretical approaches favoured by incumbent staff would not be
approved by the Victorian admitting authorities. Indeed, the suspicion
of a legal-studies orientation did attract unprecedented scrutiny of the
new programs to be offered by La Trobe and by Deakin University
(another Victorian institution with a reputation for innovation which
also had a new LL.B. program approved at the same time). The
Academic Course Appraisal Committee wanted details as to the
pedagogical methods, forms of assessment, and number of hours to be
devoted to the various topics within each subject area. The result was
that socio-legal perspectives were largely blanched from the subjects
necessary for admission to practice. Incidentally, the completion of the
"core" subjects was not necessary for the award of the LL.B. at La
Trobe, but it was rare for a student to opt not to undertake them---"just
in case" they decided to be admitted later on, or "to keep their options
open." Once again, it can be seen how the legal labour market plays a
powerful role in securing institutional conformity within the academy.
74 I. Duncanson, "Degrees of Law: Interdisciplinarity in the Law Discipline" (1996) 5 Griffith
L. Rev. 77 at 80.
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The LL.B. students shared optional subjects with B.A. students,
but a schism manifested itself at an early stage: "We want more law
subjects," chorused many of the law students. What they wanted was
more technocratic law of the "core" variety, for they put in petitions for
advanced contracts, trade practices, and mainstream taxation (eschewing
the critical feminist tax course that was offered). They also claimed that
they were academically superior to legal studies students and should be
in separate classes. The profile of the school began to change as more
mainstream lawyers joined the staff, and socio-legal scholars departed,
or their contracts were not renewed. The culture was rapidly being
transformed from a socio-legal studies environment to that of a
traditional law school.
David Friedrichs has written about the way in which those who
study the legal system are marginalized within the legal culture,
particularly if they adopt an interdisciplinary, critical, and humanistic
approach.75 Unquestioning deference to the dominant legal culture is
all-important, as law students soon realize that it is dangerous for a
lawyer to look in the mirror. As Richard Collier has noted,
"methodological reflexivity ... in law ... remains ... akin to heresy." 76
Thus, La Trobe staff, as well as students, sought to secure their futures
and to legitimate their intellectual positions by disowning critique, or
even by dissociating themselves from legal studies altogether.
More recent changes in government policy have also played a
role in narrowing the curricular canvas. Since a conservative (Liberal)
government came into office in 1996 at the federal level, it has been busy
contracting the public sphere by "curbing" expenditure and by instituting
privatizing measures. Higher education has not been immune. La
Trobe University determined that more law and less arts students would
be enrolled in what is no longer a Faculty of Social Science, but a Faculty
of Law and Management, clearly signalling the new economic turn.
Gone is the requirement that LL.B. applicants have at least two years of
university education; the "market" is to be directed primarily to (the
more docile?) school-leavers. As a result of changes to the Higher
Education Contribution Scheme, law is now costed at a higher rate than
arts, so that B.A. and LL.B. students can no longer take the same legal
studies subjects: the schism has been set in concrete. Furthermore, legal
studies subjects, such as those involving feminism and critical
criminology, have been rationalized, while new subjects "more
75 Supra note 10. Compare L.M. Friedman, "The Law and Society Movement" (1986) 38
Stan. L. Rev. 763.
7 6
"Masculism, Law and Law Teaching" (1991) 19 Int'l J. Soc. L. 427 at 434.
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appropriate" for law students are being introduced. They involve the
hard, technocratic law that the students lobbied for, while legal studies
students are left with the remnants of the critical, the interdisciplinary,
and the theoretical subjects perceived to be elastic and dispensable-a
point made more poignant by encouraging staff in disfavoured areas of
specialization to take early retirement packages. However, the magnetic
effect of "hard" law is also affecting legal studies in the changed climate
-the more technocratic the content, the more like "real" law it is, and
the more attractive to students. In this way, the "social" is contained so
that the voices of women and "others" are muted or silenced altogether
within an abstract and universalized discourse designed to privilege
mainstream and corporate interests. While academics still theoretically
have a space in which to articulate critical ideas, the Damoclean sword
of downsizing, wielded by university administrators, has induced a
remarkable quiescence regarding changes to the academy, including the
demise of legal studies. Ian Duncanson, one of the few scholars to have
spoken out, puts forth a persuasive case for the retention of legal studies
which, he argues, must necessarily "operate at some remove from the
traditional vocational priorities of the law discipline." 77
A further dimension of rationalization relates to practical legal
training (PLT), which is offered in lieu of articles in some Australian
states as a prerequisite to admission.78 The narrowing effect of PLT on
the law graduate's vision is comparable to that of the American bar
exams in reining in diversity.79 As a result of the changes in post-
secondary education funding policies, P LT is being cut back.
Nevertheless, because of the concern by law schools that their graduates
might be unable to practice if denied access to PLT, some law schools
have responded by including more skills training, including drafting,
interviewing, dispute resolution, negotiation, and advocacy in their LL.B.
curricular offerings.8 0 While law schools might be better equipped to
77 
"The Ends of Legal Studies," supra note 18 at 12.
78 Formal PLT courses were developed in the 1970s to overcome the unevenness of the
articling experience offered by law firms. A full-time course usually lasts six or seven months. In
addition to receiving lectures on the day-to-day problems of practice, students also receive "hands
on" practical experience by being divided into simulated "firms."
79 Compare Garkawe, supra note 14.
80 A. Lamb, "Changes in Attitude, Changes in Latitude: The Changing Climate in Pre-
Admission Practical Legal Training in New South Wales" (1995) 13 J. Prof. Legal. Educ. 173 at 179.
The University of Newcastle Law School (NSW), for example, incorporated so much clinical
experience in its law degree that it was able to be accredited as a practical legal training course, in
addition to satisfying the substantive components. Other universities have responded by offering
PLT training as a full fee-paying course available to law graduates.
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teach practical skills than many law firms,8 1 and skills can be taught
innovatively,8 2 the technocratic and vocational imperatives inevitably
assume centre stage so that the critical and reflexive voice is even more
likely to be disqualified in skills teaching than in other facets of the
curriculum.
Australian higher education is in a state of flux as a result of
changes induced by the new economy. Many universities have already
decided to charge full fees for at least some law places; others will offer
entire programs on a full fee-paying basis, designed to attract students by
adopting a minimalist approach to legal education and qualifying them
for admission in the shortest possible time. Again, the effect is to
emphasize technocratic law as the only legitimate substance of the law
curriculum and to make everything else dispensable.
It might also be noted that the academy is in the process of
sloughing off its long-cherished norms of collegiality in favour of
bureaucratized, top-down, managerialist forms of governance, reflecting
the "Fordism" that has transformed law firms. Eugene Clark and
Martin Tsamenyi refer to this phenomenon as "creeping corporatism,"83
whereby academics have become workers whose tenure is no longer
assured, and who are likely to be subjected to multifarious disciplinary
technologies of surveillance, which could even include clocking on and
off, according to the recommendations of one university vice-chancellor.
Deans and unit heads, who are responsible for the policing of staff, are
likely to be appointed, rather than elected, and they themselves are
likely to be subject to supervision by an additional layer of control,
comprising "mega-deans" and pro-vice-chancellors. Reflecting the
gendered pyramidal structure of the law firm, the apex has become more
overtly masculinized and difficult for women and "others" to inhabit,
while the pyramidal base, comprising support staff and academics
employed on a casual basis or short-term contract, remains feminized
and ethnicized.
With the example of Law and Legal Studies at La Trobe
University and the changes that have occurred in the funding of
Australian universities, I have sought to show that corporatist and
masculinist forms of power flow through whatever sites are available,
81 See N.L Schultz, "How Do Lawyers Really Think?" (1992) 42 J. Legal Educ. 57.
82 See M. Le Brun & R. Johnstone, The Quiet (R)evolution: Improving Student Learning in Law
(North Ryde, Australia: Law Book, 1994).
83 "Legal Education in the Twenty-First Century: A Time of Challenge" in P. Birks, ed.,
Pressing Problems in the Law: What Are Law Schools For?, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996) at 43.
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including any that might arise out of opportunities created by the new
economy. The dominant are thereby able subtly to continue to shape
the law school environment in order better to serve their interests, while
simultaneously limiting the possibility of critique by destabilizing
academic positions. Thus, it can be seen that the launching of a radical
project from within a law school was a risky enterprise; as Peter
Goodrich has observed: "The dice are loaded against a politically radical
critical legal studies."8 4
V. CONCLUSION
Feminist scholarship has sought assiduously to alter the
landscape of legal education over the last two decades.85 Indeed, there
has been a marked broadening of issues in course curricula and
textbooks, together with a notable change in the content and character
of mainstream law journals, as well as special issues and journals
dedicated to feminist legal scholarship.8 6 Feminism also has exerted an
effect on legal theory,8 7 as has critical race theory,88 and Queer theory.8 9
However, critical legal theory of whatever kind is marginal to the
facilitative and technocratic project of the law school. The marginality
of subjects such as "Women and the Law," "Aborigines and the Law,"
"Sexuality and the Law," "Law and Literature," "Law and Culture," and
so on, is secured through their optional and "add-on" status. The
message of optionality affirms the peripheral status of all critical and
theoretical subjects to the calculus of the technical, which are
84 "Sleeping With the Enemy," supra note 73 at 323.
85 See A. Detlev, The Effects of Feminist Jurisprudence on the Content and Pedagogy in Legal
Education (Ph.D. Thesis in Education, University of California, Los Angeles, 1992) (Ann Arbor:
IMI Dissertation Services, 1993).
86 The bibliography is vast; I could not begin to do justice to it. To illustrate the exponential
growth in feminist legal publishing, it might be noted that there are now more than two dozen
English-language, feminist law journals, most of which have appeared in the last decade: see M.
Minow, "The Young Adulthood of a Women's Law Journal" (1997) 20 Harv. Women's L.J. 1.
87 See, for example, M.H. Kramer, Critical Theory and the Challenge of Feminism: A
Philosophical Reconception (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); and Minda, supra note 8.
88 See, for example, G. Bird, G. Martin & J. Nielsen, eds., Majah: Indigenous Peoples and the
Law (Sydney: Federation, 1996); K. Crenshaw et al., eds., Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that
Formed the Movement (New York: New Press, 1995); and R. Delgado, ed., Critical Race Theory: The
Cutting Edge (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
89 See, for example, R. Robson, Lesbian (Out)Lai: Survival Under the Rule of Law (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Firebrand, 1992).
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dispensable at times of economic rationalization. Thus, despite the
effort expended, critical theory generally has exerted surprisingly little
impact upon the mainstream curriculum. Indeed, as I have argued, it is
the role of technocentrism to resist such destabilizing incursions because
what we are witnessing is the attempt to re-absorb the study of law into
mainstream intellectual lifeY0 Such a project necessarily must represent
a further site of contest because few practitioners are likely to
acknowledge the legitimacy of the desire of legal academics to be
accepted within the academic community as bona fide scholars and
intellectuals.
Rather than rely upon the doubtful impact of optional subjects
within the law curriculum, and the ad hoe and uncertain trajectory of
social change, some feminist scholars have deliberately set but to
produce gender-sensitive materials for the "core curriculum." 91 In
Australia, a federal government initiative was launched, following a
period of intense media focus on "gender bias in the judiciary" in 199392
which involved consultants preparing materials on the themes of
citizenship, work, and violence. 93 Copies of the materials were sent to
all law schools and were made available on the Internet, but it was left to
individual academics to determine what use they would make of them.
While the impact of such initiatives cannot be gauged accurately, the
powerful discourses of "academic freedom" and "political correctness,"
together with the norms of masculinist and corporate orthodoxy,
ensured that the materials would not be embraced unequivocally. In any
case, the inclusion of the occasional article within the legal canon that
recognizes women as litigants, or in subject positions other than that of
90 Twining, supra note 16 at xix.
91 See American Bar Association, Commission on Women in the Profession, Elusive Equality:
The Experiences of Women in Legal Education (Executive Summary) (Chicago: American Bar
Association, 1996).
92 The most notorious of these instances involved a remark by Bollen J. of the South
Australian Supreme Court in the course of a marital rape trial to the effect that "rougher than usual
handling" was acceptable on the part of a husband towards a wife who was less than willing to
engage in sexual intercourse: R. v.Johns (26 August 1992), (S. Aust. S.C.) [unreported].
93 The citizenship materials were prepared by Professor Sandra Berns, Ms Paula Baron, and
Professor Marcia Neave, and the Work and Violence materials by Professor Regina Graycar and
Associate Professor Jenny Morgan: see R. Graycar & J. Morgan, "Legal Categories, Women's Lives
and the Law Curriculum OR: Making Gender Examinable" (1996) 18 Sydney L. Rev. 431. The
writer chaired the overseeing committee. Of course, gender bias in the judiciary is by no means a
recent phenomenon. Yet, as the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson observes, it has only recently been
"discovered," which has led to the establishment of a large number of gender bias task forces: see
"Toward a Courtroom of One's Own: An Appellate Court Judge Looks at Gender Bias" (1993) 61
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1209.
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victims, does not transform the law curriculum. 94 On the contrary,
selective inclusion may illustrate how diverse knowledge can be
domesticated so that its dangerousness is neutralized. Legal education
has a remarkable capacity to "water down and absorb seemingly
discordant and threatening ideas."95 Indeed, the retention of the form
of law, while adding in "the other," as I have argued in respect of
discrimination complaints, actually may legitimize the status quo,
thereby illustrating how law is thoroughly imbricated with the corporate
imperative and benchmark masculinity.
While the discursive attempts to alter the gender and colour of
law are not unimportant, they are unable to displace the potency of
technocentrism. The role of technical reason is crucial in decentring and
diffusing power, a phenomenon that Wendy Brown refers to as
"centrifugation," 96 the converse of the centripetal effect on competing
knowledges, on which I have focused. Nevertheless, there is a symbiosis
between these twin movements-the centrifugation of power and the
centripetal effect of the technocratic (technocentrism)-as they move in
opposite directions to confuse and diffuse the loci of corporate and
masculinist power. This fragmentation suggests a more complicated
phenomenon than a simple dominance theory of class or patriarchy. I
have argued that moves towards the new economy, including the global
phenomenon of large corporate law firms and the privatization of public
goods, have been facilitated by the magnetic, albeit numbing, effects of
technocentrism to which law students quickly succumb. The law school
culture, including modes of assessment, the pressure to be accepted as a
high-class professional, and the lure of the legal labour market serve to
neutralize student resistance, even if the partiality of techni is glimpsed
through the fog that is induced by studying countless cases and statutes.
To prevent the possibility of insurgency in legal practice, I have also
argued that the bureaucratized corporate law firm itself constitutes
another disciplinary regime. Government and university changes reveal
there are in fact "polymorphous disciplinary mechanisms" in operation
that underpin and normalize (corporate) power.9 7 In seeking to project
an image of itself as value-free and neutral, law is able to accommodate
-chameleon-like-divergent interests, including those perceived to be
94 C. Menkel-Meadow, "Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal
Ethics" in Parker & Sampford, eds., supra note 43, 25 at 54.
95 J. Feinman & M. Feldman, "Pedagogy and Politics" (1985) 73 Geo. L.J. 875 at 925.
9 6 Supra note 1 at 34.
97 PowerlKnowledge, supra note 3 at 106.
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in vogue at a particular moment, such as sex, race, sexuality, and post-
colonialism. The commitment is parlous, however, and may be
jettisoned if education programs have to be rationalized or if it becomes
threatening, as may be seen in the contemporary rolling back of
affirmative action in the United States and elsewhere. The insidious way
that law operates was percipiently remarked upon by Alexis de
Tocqueville well over a century ago:
The lawyers [of the United States] form a party which is but little feared and scarcely
perceived, which has no badge peculiar to itself, which adapts itself with great flexibility
to the exigencies of the time, and accommodates itself without resistance to all the
movements of the social body. But this party extends over the whole community, and
penetrates into all the classes which compose it; it acts upon the country imperceptibly,
but finally fashions it to suit its own purposes.98
The "deification of technicality" 99 is denounced from time to
time but few legal critics are prepared to confront the full import of de
Tocqueville's words, that is, that dominant interests are complicit in
fashioning law in their own image. Marlene Le Brun and Richard
Johnstone, for example, acknowledge the impoverishment of a rules-
oriented approach in legal education, and the reluctance to change100
While they identify a number of endogenous factors as to why law
schools perpetuate a rule-based image of law, including convention and
deference to hierarchyl01 they tend to disregard factors such as the
prevailing socio-economic trends and the growth of corporatism. On the
other hand, quite a few legal scholars have expressed concern about the
commercialization of legal practice and the decline of
professionalism,10 2 and about the malaise that has beset the legal
profession, including the profound dissatisfaction and cynicism regarding
the teaching and practice of law, particularly in the United States.103
Harry Edwards suggests that the growing disarray in the profession can
be directly related to the growing incoherence in law teaching and
98 Democracy in America, trans. H. Reeve (Cambridge: Sever and Francis, 1862) at 358.
99 L.M. Wormser, The True Function of Schools of Law (New York: Bronx County Bar
Association, 1923) at 17. Compare Marcuse, supra note 2.
100 Supra note 82.
101 Ibid. at 28-38.
102 See, for example, Sampford & Parker, "Legal Regulation, Ethical Standard-Setting and
Institutional Design" in Parker & Sampford, eds., supra note 43, 11 at 12; and Galanter & Palay,
supra note 56 at 2.
103 See Bachman, supra note 46; M.A. Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession is Transforming American Society (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994); and
Kronman, supra note 51.
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scholarship.104 Some scholars, such as Andrew Goldsmith, acknowledge
that while the practice of law is increasingly dominated by concern for
efficiency and profitability, transformation can be effected through the
academy by a pedagogy that combines theoretical, experiential, and
technical knowledgeO5
The tension between the life of the scholar and the practice of
law is long standing,106 but it is clear that the schism has become more
pronounced. Anthony Kronman goes so far as to suggest that the
tension in the case of American legal education can be described as
pathological,107 a condition for which he holds anti-prudential
movements, such as Critical Legal Studies, responsible.108 Kronman
evinces an idealized longing for the past when the "lawyer-statesman"
was committed to serving the public good. 109
Far from idealizing the past, feminist, critical race, and Queer
legal scholars focus on the future in their endeavours to envision the way
things might be. Many have rejected legal practice as a subject of study
in favour of more arcane and esoteric areas of scholarship and remain
deeply suspicious of the sexism, racism, and homophobia that typifies
legal practice--corporate practice, in particular. The reflexivity, the
interrogation of power, and the nature of micropolitical studies has
rendered impossible a return to the modernist methodologies of the
past, despite the institutional pressures to do so. Has it become the fate
of postmodern intellectuals then, as Peter Goodrich asks, to be tied to a
specific institution and its practice, while diverting their gaze
elsewhere? 10
Although not optimistic about changing the gender and colour of
law because of the way the exigencies of the new economy have
neutralized past gains, I do not wish to suggest that the legal system is
104 H.T. Edwards, "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession" (1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 at 75.
105 "Heroes or Technicians? The Moral Capacities of Tomorrow's Lawyers" (1996) 14 J. Prof.
Legal Educ. 1.
106 See, for example: Twining, supra note 16 at 53; Edwards, supra note 104; A.V. Dicey, Can
English Law be Taught at the Universities? (Inaugural Lecture delivered at All Souls College, Oxford,
21 April 1883) (London: Macmillan, 1883) at 29; and W. Blackstone, An Analysis of the Laws of
England, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1758) at 37.
1 0 7 Supra note 51.
108 Ibid. at 268. Compare M.R. Martini, Marx Not Madison: The Crisis of American Legal
Education (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997).
109 Supra note 51 at 307. Compare Martini, supra note 108.
110 "Sleeping With the Enemy," supra note 73 at 317.
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totally closed. As Foucault has demonstrated, power is never totalizing;
it always generates a resistance that creates instability.1)) Thus, some
law students, especially those who carry the seeds of "otherness" with
them will not accept unconditionally the power of orthodoxy. Their
questioning unsettles law's claims to truth, neutrality, and universality.
In addition, critical legal scholarship of all kinds endeavours to resist the
tentacles of technocentrism. As I have suggested, law journals are
overflowing with articles that explore alternative forms of knowledge in
conjunction with alternative pedagogies, including those emanating from
law and feminism, critical race theory, and law and literature. However,
while the dynamism of postmodern scholarship can be intellectually
exciting, its impact has been limited, not only because of the technocratic
imperative, but because it evinces only the most marginal relationship
with the academic discipline of law.1l 2 At the barriers of legitimate legal
knowledge, technocentrism either resists what is threatening or
assimilates a few anodyne notions. The homologous relationship
between the core subjects of the law degree and corporate practice must
be understood as ongoing sites of contest that demand eternal scholarly
vigilance. The new corporatism is not just another modernist narrative
that has passed its use-by date.
111 The History of Sexuality, An Introduction, vol. 1, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Random
House, 1978) at 114.
112 "Sleeping With the Enemy," supra note 73 at 304.
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